THE ISLAMIC STATE AND GLOBAL JIHAD

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Abstract

This paper aims at providing an explanation why the Islamic State made a strategic shift and started terrorist campaign against the West. The main thesis argues that an attack on Western countries is a retaliatory strike for international military intervention against the Islamic State. The Islamic State also believes it will play a key role in an impending apocalypse, and its terrorist activities against the West largely derive from that belief. The focus of the study is on the analysis of religious terrorism as a projection of violence aimed towards realization of political goals, ideological foundations of militant Islamism as a system of ideas and beliefs that foster violent activities, doctrine of the Islamic State as a codification of its beliefs and activity, and global terrorism as a type of asymmetric war against Western countries. The research has found that ISIS has created a proto-state based on Salafi-jihadi doctrine, managed to portray itself as a religiously legitimate actor among tens of thousands of extremists from all around the world. Deeply committed to the Prophetic methodology, ISIS's leaders and jihadists initiated total jihad against their opponents, regarding the atrocities as a divine commandment to destroy their enemies. It used international military intervention as a sign of foretold battle against the West and launched indiscriminate terrorist campaign in Europe and North America. With territorial loses in Iraq and Syria, ISIS will focus on terrorist plots in both domestic and foreign theaters. It will try to claim victory over the West by hitting it with lethal terrorist attacks, with the goal of gaining followers and assuming al-Qaeda's mantle.

Keywords: The Islamic State, apocalypse, jihad, terrorism

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1. INTRODUCTION

The rapid rise of the so-called Islamic State, also known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), or by its Arabic abbreviation Daʾesh stunned the world. In a short time period, ISIS conquered large proportions of Iraq and Syria and established the first caliphate in the modern Muslim world. It has created a blood-soaked proto-state characterized by excessive brutality, violent jihad and strict interpretation of Islamic law. Its Salafi-jihadi doctrine based on theological puritanism and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad aims towards depraving existing political systems in order to establish God's rule on Earth. Its fanatical religious zeal and indiscriminate violence has cost lives thousands of people from Iraq and Syria. But ISIS did not stop there. In just a few months after the establishment of the caliphate, ISIS made a strategic shift and turned its weapons on the West.

Regional violence soon turned into global jihad. War against the far enemy resulted with terrorist attacks in both Europe and North America. ISIS's extremists and lone-wolf attackers have taken lives of hundreds of civilians and vowed to continue its global jihad until the end of the world.

This paper aims at providing an explanation why the Islamic State made a strategic shift and started terrorist campaign against the West. The main thesis argues that an attack on Western countries is a retaliatory strike for international military intervention against the Islamic State. The Islamic State also believes it will play a key role in an impending apocalypse, and its terrorist activities against the West largely derive from that belief. In order to find an answer to the research question, the research examines the context and the causes behind the Islamic State and what drives it to wage an asymmetric war on global scale. The study has focused on the analysis of religious terrorism as a

projection of violence aimed towards realization of political goals, ideological foundations of militant Islamism as a system of ideas and beliefs that foster violent activities, doctrine of the Islamic State as a codification of its beliefs and activity, and ISIS's global terrorist campaign as a type of asymmetric war against Western countries.

This study aims to expand upon previous research by giving depth to understanding of ISIS's ideology, doctrine and indiscriminate violence toward both the near and far enemy. It is a qualitative type of study where both descriptive and analytical method are used. The research data used for this analysis comes largely from an extensive collection of material and information extracted from various sources such as books, journals, reports, documents, and articles. The result of this research aims at providing a constructive framework for understanding ISIS's terrorist threat.

2. TERRORISM AND RELIGION

Modern religious terrorism surfaced around 1980s. Since then, the most devastating and deadliest terrorist attacks were perpetrated by religious terrorist groups. The 1983 Beirut bombing attack on American and French peacekeepers and the 1992 attack on Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires by Islamic Jihad, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo, the 1995 assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist, the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings by Hamas and the 1998 United States embassy bombings in Kenia and Tanzania by al-Qaeda, just to name a few, were all carried out by religiously inspired militants. Walter Laqueur notes that the real innovation in the late twentieth century is the appearance of radical religious (or quasi-religious) nationalist groups adopting terrorism as their main form of struggle, sometimes within the framework of established religion (mainly Islam, but also Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism), and sometimes in the form of millenarian sects [1]. Although the re-emergence of religious motivations for terrorism over the last decades involved elements of all the world's major religions

and smaller cults and sects, the role of Islamic terrorism became predominant type of terrorism in the contemporary world. The 9/11 onslaught in the United States followed by the attacks in Madrid, London and other cities were a clear sign that Islamic terrorism will figure predominantly on the global agenda in the twenty-first century.

Understanding of religious terrorism would be impossible without a comprehension of what terrorism really is. Writing about terrorism, Paul Wilkinson described the term as "systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to serve political ends" [2]. Bruce Hoffman defined terrorism as "violence – or, equally important the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim" [3]. For Jessica Stern terrorism is "an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience" [4]. Analysts from the Jonathan Institute in Jerusalem in 1979 preferred a definition which states that "terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends" [5]. In spite of efforts by the most prominent experts on terrorism, there is no agreed definition for the term. Walter Laqueur thought that providing a comprehensive definition was virtually impossible because of the great variety of circumstances in which this type of violence had appeared and the numerous and often competing political causes whose advocates had used it [6]. For the purpose of this paper, however, the working assumption is that terrorism is a deliberate violence or threat of violence against the innocent to inspire fear for achieving political ends.

While there is no agreed comprehension definition of terrorism, there is general understanding that terrorism is a political concept. Terrorism is always political, even when it also evinces other motives, such as the religious, the economic or the social [5]. This is critical in distinguishing terrorism from different types of violence. In spite of political motives, terrorism is not a political movement or an ideology, but a tactic. Terrorism may be used on its own or as part of a wider unconventional war. It can

be employed by desperate and weak minorities, by states as a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by belligerents as an accompaniment in all types and stages of warfare [2]. Terrorism is also a psychological warfare. The primary psychological weapon of terrorism is fear. It aims at a target audience other than the actual victims of the act. The immediate victims are not as important as the broader message sent to the public [7]. Violence is not an end itself, but a mean to create fear in the minds of targeted public. The element of fear-indictment is crucial for terrorism. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group that the immediate victims of the violence and to publicize a cause, as well as to coerce a target to acceding to the terrorists' aims [2].

There is no magic formula to explain why people choose to be terrorists. Terrorism has been used to achieve political goals by many different groups and individuals that it is virtually impossible to provide a profile of the typical terrorist. Militant Islamist of today come from a wider demographic range, including university students, families with an impoverished background, highly educated professionals, married men in their late forties, and rarely women. Marc Sageman studied the biographies of the 172 members of al-Qaeda and found that two-thirds were middle or upper middle class and that 60 percent had gone to college, several had doctorates. Their average age was twenty-six [8]. As for the radicals who join the so-called Islamic state, a 2016 study from New America, a Washington-based think tank, found that the average fighter at the time of joining ISIS was 26 to 27 years old, single, had travelled to less than two foreign counties, had the educational equivalent of a high school degree, had basic religious knowledge, reported no previous fighting experience, and had the professional equivalent of someone between an unskilled laborer and a blue-collar worker [9].

Those who are joining religious terrorist groups are extremists who abandoned rational thinking and try to pursue their own vision of the divine will. They are motivated by what they identify as a reli-

gious mission. The practitioners of the new terrorism believe themselves to be acting in the name of God. And it is to God that their deeds are directed, often in the hope that the violence will accelerate or radically transform the course of human history [10]. For for those who believe themselves themselves to be acting in the name of God and against his enemies violence is regarded as a divine command purpose or sacramental act. Religious terrorists also believe their religion is the only true and to protect it with life is a noble cause. Their religious fanaticism makes them extremely violent. If terrorists are religious believers, they might regard the slaughter as a commandment to destroy the infidel enemy once and for all [1]. For the religious terrorists, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators therefore often disregard the political, moral, or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists [3].

One of the most disturbing features of religious terrorists is their eschatological presumptuousness about the world. The idea that life on earth will come to a violent end is central notion of terrorists who are preoccupied with the eschatology, apocalyptic concept referred as "the end of the world". The believers in this apocalyptic perspective are convinced that there is no salvation outside their ranks and that those who do not believe will be destroyed and suffer eternal damnation [1]. Those who do not share their religious convictions are targets of indiscriminate violence. Terrorist groups who share apocalyptic concept of the world are most prone to develop the capability to mount catastrophic, mass casualty attacks, including the attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

3. THE ROOTS OF RADICAL ISLAM

Many Muslims today believe that the conditions of Islamic world require drastic reform of their societies. Their discontent derives from fragile architecture of the Islamic world. The governments of that world are corrupt, incompetent, and oppressi-

ve. Services are atrocious, jobs are few, and hope for a better future is minimal. Most people who do get ahead do so by connections and servility. Widespread poverty and the failure of Arab governments to meet the basic needs of their peoples provided an opportunity for Islamic radicals to develop a stronger popular base for support [2].

The most radical voice of the Muslim world is that of jihadists. The jihadists are a self-appointed collection of religious fanatics who have launched a holy war, a jihad, against the United States and everything American. They have also declared war on Israel, Europe, anyone else who opposes their vision of a world governed by Islamic law [11]. Colloquially called jihadists, militant Islamists or Salafists, they are intent on establishing an Islamic state through violence. The term Salafi simply means early Islamic, referring to those who lived in the first centuries after Muhammad. In religious terms, it means opposition to reform and the purification of Islam from alien elements [12].

The Jihadists of various colors and stripes want to purge the infidel and the deviant from Muslim society and to construct a proper Islamic order under a restored caliphate modeled on the first Islamic State established by Muhammad in the seventh century. The caliphate would be based on God's injunctions set down in the basic texts of Islam, Quran and the Sunna (the words and deeds of the Prophet) where religion, politics and all other aspects of human life would be governed through sharia (Islamic law). In order to create a righteous Islamic order, the jihadists need to replace existing political regimes in Muslim countries with a true Islamic society. They believe that the only way to resurrect the caliphate is through a violent struggle, a jihad. Much as the Prophet Muhammed declared a jihad against the infidels from Mecca, so the jihadists believe it is their task to drive the infidels from the lands of Islam [13]. They see jihad as a requirement in a world divided between what they designate as dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar al-Harb (house of war). It is considered as permanent and universal religious obligation for all true Muslims to engage in a struggle to defend dar al-Islam and conquer dar al-Harb.

One of the most prominent Islamic thinkers who distinguished sharply between dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb was a medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. He issued a fatwa that labeled the Mongols invaders as infidels in spite of their conversion to Islam. The reason was their practice of mixing the creeds of several religions, failure to implement the Sariah and conflict with the Mamluc Sultanate in Cairo. Hence, the Mongols become the lawful object of jihad. For him, jihad was "the best of the forms of voluntary service man can devote to God" [14]. Later generations, from Wahhabi movement to modern Egypt's Sayyid Qutb, Islamic Jihad, the assassins of Anwar Sadat, and Osama bin Laden, would use the logic of Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwa on the Mongols to call for a jihad against "un-Islamic" Muslim rulers and elites and against the West [15].

His teaching served as inspiration for Muhammad ibn-Abdul Wahhab, a scholar and religious leader who founded the Wahhabi movement is Saudi Arabia. He issued a fatwa that labeled all non-Wahhabis as infidels, proclaiming jihad even against the Ottoman Empire. The Wahhabis' aim was to replace orthodox Islam with their puritanical doctrine, which would become the state religion of Saudi Arabia [16]. Wahhabis reject the tradition that war is the lesser form of jihad, while purification of the self is the greater form, a tradition widely accepted by mainstream clerics [17].

In the early twentieth century, the jihadist's doctrine was further shaped by the radical teaching of an Egyptian imam Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and a Pakistani Islamic philosopher Mawlana Mawdudi, founder of Jamaat-e-Islami. Their organizations were designed to reestablish Islamic rule in the Muslim world. Both al-Banna and Mawdudi blamed westernized ruling elites and European imperialism for the misery of the Muslim world. Al-Banna rejected the preference for the spiritual jihad (greater jihad) over a military (lesser jihad) one. Since Muslim lands had been invaded, he said, it was incumbent on all Muslims

to repel their invaders just as it was an Islamic imperative for Muslims to oppose rulers who blocked the establishment of Islamic governments [15]. Mawdudi followed the same jihadi concept. For him, the five traditional Pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, the feast of Ramadan, pilgrimage, and almsgiving) were merely phases of training and preparation for jihad, the struggle against those of Allah's creatures who had usurped his sovereignty. By the pen of Mawdudi, religion was turned into an ideology of political struggle [18].

Their teachings had a great effect on Sayyid Qutb, the most radical and most influential leader and ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood. He sharply divided the world into two diametrically opposed camps and designated modern societies as un-Islamic and anti-Islamic. For Qutb, the West was the enemy par excellence of the Muslims, afraid of Islam and aware of its spiritual superiority. As Qutb saw it, there could never be peace with the West. The struggle was not about territory but about truth and which truth would prevail in the world [12]. For Qutb, jihad, as armed struggle in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of anti-Islamic governments and the neocolonialism of the West and the East (Soviet Union), was incumbent upon all Muslims. There could be no middle ground [15]. He wrote that there is no defensive, limited war but only offensive, total war that should be wedged upon domestic and foreign enemies who usurped God's sovereignty. In jihadists' eyes, Qutb appears bigger than life, a model to live up to and an example to be imitated [19].

Radical Islamist ideas were further strengthened by the writings of Muhammad al-Faraj, a member of the radical organization Islamic Jihad. Faraj believed that the decline of Muslim societies was made possible by those who had lulled the community into believing that jihad was nonviolent; the restoration of the Muslim world to the straight path of Islam hinged on reclaiming the true meaning of jihad, the forgotten or neglected requirement of Islam. Faraj maintained that jihad was the sixth pillar of Islam, forgotten or obscured by the majority of ulama and

Muslims [15]. For Faraj, everything was subordinated to jihad against the domestic tyrants, the "Pharaoh", and the establishment of the rule of God. Faraj coined the terms "near enemy" and "far enemy" and assigned the highest priority to military confronting the former. According to Faraj, everything else, including liberating occupied Jerusalem, took a back seat the fight against local apostates [19].

The importance of jihad against the far enemy was emphasized by Umar Abdel Rahman, a blind sheikh who was a spiritual leader of the violent Egyptian group al Gamaa al Islamiyya and living guru for various groups of militant Islamists. He issued the fatwas they needed, be it for robbing and killing local goldsmiths (usually Christian) or for launching war against America, which, according to him, was the source of all evil and the main enemy of Islam, responsible for the unhappy condition of the Muslim world. Every conspiracy against Islam, every bit of scheming emanated from America and the task of terrorism was to strike terror against America, and not to be afraid of the "terrorism" label. This approach was what jihad was all about: jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, and with the missile, jihad against God's enemies [12].

Abdallah Azzam, the chief ideologue of al-Qaeda and an early spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden, used the same jihadi doctrine to radicalize and mobilize the Muslim world. For Azzam, jihad was a pivotal concept in a struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, removal of apostate Muslim regimes and the establishment of an Islamic state. He considered jihad as imperative for the defense of the Muslims against the aggression of atheists. Azzam made clear that the jihad in Afghanistan was just a beginning: "This duty will not end with victory in Afghanistan; jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other lands that were Muslim are returned to us so that Islam will reign again: before us lie Palestine, Bokhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, southern Yemen, Tashkent and Andalusia [20].

The main contemporary ideologue of global

jihad was Ayman al-Zawahiri who has become the leader of al-Qaida after Osama bin Laden's death. In his book Knights under the Prophet's Banner Zawahiri expressed his beliefs that the United States is removing Islam from power through rigged elections, brutality, and force. For Zawahiri, treaties, peace negotiations, and bans on weapons are steps in the direct occupation of Muslim land by American forces. Thus, jihad becomes an ideological struggle for survival, a war with no truce. "The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global hostility towards us", says Zawahiri, adding that the 11 September 2001 attacks were just an opening salvo against the Christian and Jewish infidels. Now the very same jihadists, who made the fight against the near enemy a key operational priority, shifted gears and called for a new "jihad" against the far enemy, particularly the United States and its Western allies. The road to Jerusalem no longer passed directly through Cairo, Algiers, Amman, or Riyadh but rather through a double-line highway, including stops in Washington, New York, Madrid, London, and other Western Capitals [19].

4. RADICAL DOCTRINE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

ISIS draws on, and draws strength from, doctrines that have broad resonance among jihadists. In addition to the growing attractiveness of teachings of Qutb and other Islamic thinkers, ISIS follows distinctive variety of Islam based on its definition of messianic ideology. Gerges writes that Baghdadi and his inner circle rely particularly on three Salafi-jihadist manifestos to rationalize and justify what they do: The Management of Savagery by Abu Bakr al-Najji, Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad by Abu Abdullah al-Muhajjer, and The Essentials of Making Ready [for Jihad] by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, aka Abdel-Qader Ibn Abdel-Aziz or Dr. Fadil. Despite differences, there are common conceptual threads among the three manifestos that offer theoretical guidance for ISIS's actions. First, the three books call for all-out war and advocate offensive jihad as opposed to defensive jihad in order to bleed the kuffar (infidels) or the enemies of Islam, thus creating chaos and fear. Second, although this total war should target both the near enemy and the far enemy, they prioritize the fight against tyrannical Muslim rulers who do not apply shariah (Qur'anic law). Finally, all three manifestos call on the movement's planners and lieutenants to kill with impunity, to observe no limits and follow in the footsteps of the Prophet's companions, who, in their opinion, brutally punished dissenters and rivals [21].

These manifestos have become the ISIS's blueprints for jihad and establishment of a theocratic state. ISIS's leaders have embraced these guidelines in every detail and incorporated them into their ideology. In their viewpoint, violent jihad is presented as the only legitimate demonstration of true faith. The Islamic State emphasize this claim in the issues of its internet magazine Dabiq, claiming that Islam is a "religion of war not peace." A Dabiq article picturesquely named By the Sword says: "Waging jihad – spreading the rule of Allah by the sword – is an obligation found in the Quran, the word of our Lord… Jihad is the ultimate show of one's love for his Creator, facing the clashing of swords and buzzing of bullets on the battlefield, seeking to slaughter His enemies – whom he hates for Allah's hatred of them" [22].

In the very center of ISIS's ideology stands the preoccupation with the Apocalypse and the coming of a Messiah-like figure who will lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world. ISIS's founding fathers believe that the final confrontation with the forces of unbelief is actually taking place before them. A hadith attributed to the Prophet Muhammad about an end-of-days battle between Muslims and Christians in Dabiq, a town in rural Aleppo, is a frequent reference point—so pervasive that ISIS's propaganda magazine is named for it [23]. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome's Waterloo or its Antietam [24]. The editors of Dabiq said they adopted the name for their magazine because: "The area will play a historical role in the battles leading up to the conquests of Constantinople, then Rome."

Baghdadi and his associates depict themselves as battling the "antichrist" and paving the way for the ultimate triumph of the "Mahdi" and Islam (in Arabic, the Mahdi means "the Guided One," the central crowning element of all Islamic end-time narratives, or an expected spiritual and temporal ruler destined to establish a reign of righteousness throughout the world). This millenarian thinking is at the heart of ISIS's caliphate ideology and the global jihadist movement in general [21].

Rapid territorial conquest in Iraq and Syria enabled ISIS to establish the first jihadi Islamic state in the modern Muslim world. ISIS abolished the colonial borders between Iraq and Syria drawn by the European powers at the end of World War I and took control over the territory as large as the United Kingdom. They declared that this physical and symbolic act of recombination was the end of a British-French colonial compact that had helped draw the map of the contemporary region even before the official terminus of World War I. There would no longer be any Western fingerprint on that map, according to ISIS. Instead, there would only be the caliphate. Eventually, intoned ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, if Muslims were strong, the caliphate would again reach Spain and even conquer Rome [23]. Baghdadi's late June 2014 declaration of the caliphate in the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Iraqi's second largest city Mosul was the first such plausible claim since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. ISIS political agenda, however, is not bounded just to Iraq and Syria. It has a pattern for developing, consolidating, and expanding the caliphate. ISIS's core message "remaining and expanding" implies the caliphate that encompasses territories from the Middle East to Central Asia, from North and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa to Spain, and from the Balkans to Southeast Europe.

Its victories on the battlefield, territorial expansion, apocalyptic discourse and proclamation of the caliphate helped the Islamic State to attract thousands of newcomers from around the world. They all wished to travel to the lands where the final battles of the apocalypse will take place and join a blood-soaked proto-state based on a puritanical Medieval Islamic caliphate. The entire self-image and propaganda narrative of ISIS is based on honoring and emulating Muhammad and the four "rightly guided caliphs" who led Muslims from Muhammad's death and spread Islam to the Middle East and Africa. For the jihadists of ISIS, the Prophet and his companions are the models for all behavior, including politics, judiciary, warfare, and culture. They justify their actions on religious grounds by juxtaposing the distant past with the present and selectively citing verses from the Koran and the Sunna. Their commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment characterized by excessive brutality echoes backward looking view of Islam when barbaric practices may have been appropriate for that time but not by today's standards. Hence ISIS's tendency for beheadings, stoning, crucifixions and sex slavery.

ISIS put Islam, Sharia and jihad at the center of the caliphate. It declared itself as protector of the Sunni ummah against a number of aggressive predators, including treacherous Sunnis, apostate Shias, Iran, the United States, and the West in general. Its viciousness in particular aims at purifying the Muslim lands from perceived apostates and heretics, such as Yazidis, Kurds, Christians, and Shias, as well as Sunnis who do not share their view. Baghdadi urged followers to prioritize violence against Shiite Muslims and, after that, the Saudi royal family. Of the group's enemies, he said: "Dismember them. Snatch them as groups and individuals" [25]. Baghdadi, like AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi before him, has a genocidal worldview, according to which Shias are viewed as infidels, a fifth column in the heart of Islam who must either convert or be exterminated [21]. ISIS carnage has taken the lives of tens of thousands people in Iraq and Syria.

5. JIHAD AGAINST THE WEST

The first jihadi message of the Islamic State was not the war against the West, but the near enemy. Jihad against the West was not placed high on the ISIS's agenda. ISIS prioritized jihad against the Shia and apostate regimes of Iraq, Syria and their politi-

cal and military sponsor Iran rather than planning attacks on the United States and Europe. AQI and ISIS view the struggle against America, Europe, and even Israel as a distant secondary goal that must be deferred until a Sunni Islamic state is built in the heart of Arabia and ISIS consolidates its grip on the Iraqi and Syrian territories it occupies [21]. Foreign military intervention against the ISIS, however, urged the group to change its agenda and make a strategic shift by proclaiming jihad against the United States and its allies.

A call for global jihad was declared on September 2014, just four months after the establishment of the caliphate. In the first release since the foundation of the Islamic State, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani called for "mujahidin in Europe, America, Australia, and Canada" and across the world to defend the Islamic state against the "dozens of nations ... gathered against it". "If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be." "Do not ask for anyone's advice and do not seek anyone's verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers," said al-Adnani [26]. In May 2016, Adnani again called on followers to launch attacks on the United States and Europe during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. "Ramadan, the month of conquest and jihad. Get prepared, be ready ... to make it a month of calamity everywhere for the non-believers ... especially for the fighters and supporters of the caliphate in Europe and America. The smallest action you do in their heartland is better and more enduring to us than what you would if you were with us. If one of you hoped to reach the Islamic State, we wish we were in your place to punish the Crusaders day and night," Adnani said [27].

Those who are not able to join the caliphate are "blessed with the opportunity to serve a much greater purpose than dwelling among Muslims and waging jihad on the outer edges of the land of Islam. Indeed, you are behind enemy lines, able to strike them where it hurts them most", states the seventh issue of Dabiq [27]. ISIS spokesman summarized ISIS's global jihad by saying: "Our Quran require us to fight entire world, no exception. We will fight, and fight, and fight until the religion is entirely for Allah."

In September 2016, the Islamic State released the first issue of a new magazine called Rumiyah, calling in it for terrorist attacks in the West. In a chapter The Kafir's Blood in Halal for You, So Shed It, ISIS called for terrorist attacks in the West: "Muslims currently living in Dar al-Kufr [land of disbelief] must be reminded that the blood of the disbelievers is halal [permissible], and killing them is a form of worship to Allah, the Lord, King, and God of mankind. This includes the businessman riding to work in a taxicab, the young adults (post-pubescent "children") engaged in sports activities in the park, and the old man waiting in line to buy a sandwich. Indeed, even the blood of the kafir [unbeliever] street vendor selling flowers to those passing by is halal to shed – and striking terror into the hearts of all disbelievers is a Muslim's duty [28].

Meanwhile, ISIS leader himself issued a call to arms for fellow jihadists. Baghdadi exhorted Muslims throughout the Middle East to rise up against "the agents of the Jews and crusaders, their slaves, tails and dogs." He declared: "We see America and her allies stumbling between fear, weakness, inability and failure." Belittling Washington's plan to send more soldiers to Iraq, Baghdadi predicted that the Western powers would soon be forced to engage in ground combat with his fighters, who are concentrated mostly in eastern Syria and northwestern Iraq: "O soldiers of the Islamic State, continue to harvest the soldiers. Erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere" [28]. In Mosul, Baghdadi promised that the Islamic State will not stop its jihad until Rome is conquered. "By Allah's permission, they [US-led coalition] will be defeated. And indeed the Muslims will be victorious. By Allah's promise, they

will be victorious. And the march of the mujahidin will continue until they reach Rome."

In ISIS's apocalyptic prophesy, hostile Rome is closely associated with the inimical West. The Prophetic narration that foretells the apocalyptic battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Now that Rome has no army, it might mean any infidel army. In ISIS narrative, however, Rome is synonymous not just with the Catholic Church but with the West in general. According to their mindset, the West is waging a new crusade against the Muslim world. It is the United States and its European allies who are targeting strikes on ISIS strongholds, providing military and financial support to the regional anti-terrorist campaign against ISIS, and sending combat troops on the ground to speed up the fight against jihadists. For ISIS, all that implies that the foreign intervention is fulfillment of the ancient prophecy and a sign of the coming apocalypse. In the apocalyptic imagination of ISIS, foreign intervention has been a sign of the coming apocalypse. The announcement in August 2014 of an international coalition to fight ISIS in Syria was hailed as a sign that the Islamic prophecy was high, especially as it followed the declaration of a caliphate, another event foretold by the Prophet [23]. The conquest of Rome has become synonymous with defeat of the West. Theological preoccupation with the near enemy gave way to fixation on the far enemy.

In an ISIS's viewpoint of the world strictly divided between "the caliphate on one side and the crusaders with their apostate agents on the other" [30], jihad against the dar al-Harb is a requirement.

Strict division between two opposing camps allows ISIS to frame Western involvement in the conflict in Iraq and Syria as a campaign "them versus us", i.e. the West against Islam. Using a propaganda mix of apocalypse, puritanism, sectarianism, ultraviolence and idyll of a caliphate, ISIS mobilizes supporters and inspires them to action. The reasons for joining a global jihad can always be found. Most are associated with U.S. occupation of Iraq, participation in the anti-terrorist coalition, alleged

prosecution of the Muslims in the West or bombing attacks on ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State uses sustained airstrikes as evidence that Western countries are waging the war against Islam and portrays itself as the defender of Muslims from the Crusaders led by the United States.

International intervention against ISIS and its military setbacks in Syria and Iraq urged the group to target the far enemy by relying on its remote affiliates in Egypt and Libya and homegrown terrorists in Europe and North America. Since Adnani made the pronouncement, ISIS and lone wolf attackers inspired by the group have carried out a number of high-profile terrorist attacks on Western targets. Those attacks have killed hundreds of people and injured thousands more. A list of terrorist attacks on Western countries includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the United States. According to a running count kept by CNN, the Islamic state and its affiliates are responsible for more than 140 terrorist attacks in 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria.

The Islamic State has proved successful in triggering individual terrorist operations by unaffiliated sympathizers in Western countries. Substantial Muslim population in Western countries means there is a big pool of potential attackers on which ISIS could draw. Islamic extremism gained a foothold among radicalized Muslim communities in a number of European countries. Its presence is particularly strong in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, members of the European Union with the highest numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria per head of population.

The majority of the attacks in Western countries have been masterminded by jihadists who were inspired by ISIS, rather than those who were actually members of the group. Those who carried out rafts of deadly attacks were mostly homegrown terrorist and lone wolf attackers inspired by the group. The proportion of outgoing fighters who return from the battlefields in Iraq and Syria and plot attacks against their home country or region is

relatively small. The work of Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser found that 11 plotting returnees from an outgoing contingent of around 4,000 foreign fighters in Syria makes for a blowback rate in the order of 1 in 360 [31].

While the proportion of terrorists who return from the foreign battlefields is not huge, those who do return are more experienced, effective and dangerous operatives than nonveterans. Trained ISIS fighters were behind terror attacks at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in 2014, the 2015 Paris attacks and Brussels bombings in 2016. They were drawn from camps in Syria run by ISIS and sent back in/to Europe. The returning veterans could also help propagate extremist ideas among other extremists. The role of these more experienced men, with the spurious credibility derived from seeing combat, as a vector for violent extremist ideologies has been demonstrated again and again over recent years [32].

ISIS's strategy to expand its caliphate, instigate a sectarian war, and mount spectacular attacks on its enemies in the West played well into the group's grand plan to drag the West into a final apocalyptic showdown in Dabiq. Jihadists celebrated madly when ISIS conquered this strategically unimportant town. When it lost Dabiq to Turkish-backed rebels in October 2016, ISIS suffered mayor blow to its propaganda and apocalyptic perspective. Further territorial loses further undermined its core message of remaining and expanding. However, ISIS's leaders have found a way how to accommodate to a new realty and begun denying the importance of holding land in Iraq and Syria. They have tried to offset territorial losses and shrinking of the caliphate by emphasizing ISIS operations in Asia, Africa and the West. As it loses ground in Iraq and Syria, the group will increasingly attempt attacks on Western targets to create the perception that it is winning. In its Rumiyah issues, ISIS has been consecutively calling for terrorist attacks in the West. These attacks against the far enemy divert attention from ISIS's military losses in Syria and Iraq and also reinforce its narrative of invincibility and triumphalism [21]. Targeting

the West with homegrown terrorists, the ISIS also wants to generate hostility between domestic Muslim populations and the Western societies they live in by eliminating "the gray zone" representing coexistence between religious groups. It wants to create an "us versus them" war. The more violent and polarized a conflict gets, the easier it is for ISIS to attract support from radicalized elements within Muslim societies. Using homegrown terrorist and jihadists for striking outside its immediate theater of operations, ISIS now appears more engaged in a truly global struggle.

6. CONCLUSION

The Islamic State has dramatically changed the landscape of terrorism. It has become the first terrorist organization that annulled the formal state borders and established an Islamic proto-state with its own government, judiciary, police, and military, capable of waging both conventional and asymmetric warfare. ISIS managed to portray itself as a religiously legitimate actor among tens of thousands of extremists from all around the world. They all flowed to the caliphate to become a part of ummah and wage a holy war in the name of Allah. By bringing together battle-hardened militants with newcomer jihadists, ISIS has become the most lethal terrorist organization in recent history. Deeply committed to the Prophetic methodology, ISIS's leaders and jihadists initiated total jihad against their opponents, regarding the slaughter of perceived apostates and unbelievers as a divine commandment to destroy their enemies.

Simultaneously using both constructive and destructive ideology, the Islamic State presented itself as a state builder and apocalyptic precursor. It used the preoccupation with the apocalypse as a catalyzer for instigation of a sectarian war and offensive jihad against the near and far enemy. Firmly believing in the end-of-days confrontation with the forces of unbelief, ISIS dedicates itself to annihilate the infidel enemy once for all no matter the costs. Its apocalyptic preoccupation, fanatical devotion to the caliphate and readiness for martyrdom made

ISIS much more dangerous than other terrorist organization in the world. In a very short time period, the Islamic State managed to overshadow al-Qaeda, gained power and prestige among fellow extremists and positioned itself as the leader of global jihadist movement.

International military intervention even more inflamed religious zeal among jihadists. In their apocalyptic imagination, it was a sign that the final battle between good and evil has finally come.

Many jihadists rushed to the caliphate to take part in the apocalypse while others understood that their divinely commanded duty was to confront the far enemy in its own backyard as a means to fulfill a centuries-old prophecy. They all succumbed to ISIS's propaganda of a glorious battle against the West. In a brief period of time, ISIS made a strategic shift and called for jihad against the far enemy. The result was another jihadi blowback in Europe and North America.

With territorial loses in Iraq and Syria, howe-ver, the idea of the caliphate is dying. Continued military setbacks will lead to the physical end of the Islamic State. The caliphate will collapse and revert back to an idea again. However, it will not be the end of the group. ISIS will move to a new phase. It will likely withdraw in a shade and remain an instrument of destabilization. After territorial loses, ISIS will try to sell its propaganda through terrorist attacks on domestic and foreign targets. The group will further exploit sectarian animosity and use local branches for domestic attacks. Abroad, ISIS will rely on homegrown extremists and returnees from the battlefields for major foreign terrorist operations. It will try to claim victory over the West by hitting it with lethal terrorist attacks, with the goal of gaining followers and assuming al-Qaeda's mantle. Where its ideological appeal survives, the group will remain a major threat to international security. Thus, international antiterrorist coalition should remain focused on discretization of ISIS's ideology and reducing (of) its appeal, not just its territorial control.

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ISLAMSKA DRŽAVA I GLOBALNI DŽIHAD

Sažetak

Cilj ovog rada je objasniti zašto je islamska država učinila strateški zaokret i pokrenula terorističku kampanju protiv Zapada. Glavna hipoteza tvrdi da napad na zemlje Zapada predstavlja protuudar zbog međunarodne intervencije protiv Islamske države. Islamska država također vjeruje da će igrati ključnu ulogu u nadolazećoj apokalipsi. Njezine terorističke aktivnosti protiv Zapada uvelike proizlaze iz tog uvjerenja. Fokus ove studije je analiza religijskog terorizma kao projekcije nasilja usmjerenog k ostvarenju političkih ciljeva, ideoloških temelja militantnog Islamizma kao sustava ideja i uvjerenja koja potiču nasilne aktivnosti, doktrinu Islamske države kao kodifikaciju njezinih uvjerenja i aktivnosti te globalnog terorizma kao oblika asimetričnog rata protiv zapadnih zemalja. Istraživanje je ustanovilo da je ISIS uspostavio proto-državu utemeljenu na salafističko-džihadističkoj doktrini, uspjevši se prikazati kao religijski legitimni akter među desecima tisuća ekstremista diljem svijeta. Duboko posvećeni metodologiji poslanika Muhameda, čelnici i džihadisti Islamske države su pokrenuli totalni džihad protiv svojih protivnika, smatrajući zločine kao božansku zapovijed za uništenje njihovih neprijatelja. Grupa je iskoristila međunarodnu vojnu intervenciju kao znak nagovještene bitke protiv Zapada te pokrenula neselektivnu terorističku kampanju protiv zemalja Europe i Sjeverne Amerike. Uzevši u obzir teritorijalne gubitke u Iraku i Siriji, ISIS će se usredotočiti na terorističke napade u regiji i inozemstvu. Grupa će smrtonosnim terorističkim napadima pokušati pokazati da pobjeđuje Zapad, s ciljem pridobivanja novih sljedbenika i preuzimanjem uloge koju je na globalnoj terorističkoj sceni nekada imala al-Qaeda.

Ključne riječi: Islamska država, apokalipsa, džihad, terorizam.